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Abstract
The unprecedented geopolitical shift resulting from Brexit reflects deep socio-
economic fault lines within and beyond the UK. In many ways foreshadowing the
US presidential election of Donald Trump, Brexit brought to the surface and gave a
public voice to socio-economic divisions that were deeply embedded, sometimes
illogical, but until now had either been ignored or hushed out of ‘respectable’ pub-
lic debate. This Discussion Forum emanates from a spontaneous seminar organ-
ized 2 days after the Brexit vote on June 25, 2016 as part of the SASE conference
held in University of California–Berkeley and followed by an open call for papers by
Socio-Economic Review. The papers here draw attention to the origins of the Brexit
vote in deep-seated socio-economic divisions (O’Reilly), widening differences in
economic performance across sectors and regions of the UK (Froud, Sukhdev and
Williams) and the growth of poor quality jobs (Warhurst). Meanwhile, the political
dynamics of the Brexit vote were also shaped by the fractured nature of UK busi-
ness elites (Morgan), divisions between locals and cosmopolitans (Grey) and crea-
tive but muddled actions of elites that arguably generated consequences they
themselves failed to fully anticipate (Wood and Wright). From the perspective of
Europe, Brexit reflects a history of dysfunctional economic policy in Europe that pri-
oritized market competition in ways that neglected and ultimately undermined sol-
idarity (Boyer). Here, Brexit reflects a political strategy to both renationalize and
recommodify solidarity in the face of fears over migration, and which are likely to
have major consequences for social solidarity in Europe more generally (Frerichs
and Sankari). However, Brexit is unlikely to provide a durable social and political
solution to the wider tensions between globalization and democracy, which also
affect all countries throughout Europe (Rona-Tas). Ultimately, the Brexit vote
underlines social divisions that combine class inequalities with regional ones, not
just in Britain but throughout Europe (Le Gales).
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While much reaction to the Brexit decision has been one of shock, others commentators said
they saw it coming (Cohen, 2016; Clarke et al., 2016; Boyer, this volume). The Brexiters
seemed pretty surprised themselves: 54% of those who voted Leave had not expected to win
(Lord Ashcroft Polls, 2016). Perhaps the biggest shock was to the broken hubris of the
British political establishment revealing the fractured nature of British business elites and the
weakening of the existing social order over the past 30 years (Morgan, this volume).
As the results sank in, pandemonium broke out. As the only Prime Ministerial candidate
left standing Theresa May stepped in. Brexit became a catalyst: releasing vitriolic feuds in
the British Labour Party; resuscitating aspirations for a second Scottish Independence
Referendum and worrying those involved in the Northern Ireland peace settlement. Despite
claims that ‘we should have seen this coming’, no one could have predicted the dizzying lev-
els of political bedlam and cluelessness that ensued (Wood and Wright this volume).
The antecedents for Brexit had been bubbling under the surface of British politics for a
long time. David Cameron triggered the referendum as a means to contain the right wing
margins of the Conservative Party and stem the rising tide of the ‘people’s army’ of UKIP.
Much to their own surprise the Conservatives won a majority in the 2015 General Election.
The referendum promise, that had potentially been part of an anticipated coalition trade-off,
had now become a manifesto pledge.
It was an accident waiting to happen, according to Warhurst (this volume), and the result of
a long-awaited crisis of extreme social polarization according to Boyer (this volume). However,
the heterogeneous coalition of Leave voters suggests that other characteristics contributed to
this outcome (Grey this volume). Brexit revealed a very ugly face of xenophobia and violence
that had not been visible for decades, witnessing the attack and subsequent death of the MP Jo
Cox during the campaign and a rise in hate crimes since (NPCC, 2016; Home Office, 2016).
The dominant issue is commonly assumed to be migration according to Le Gale`s and Frerichs
and Sankari (this volume). While undoubtedly significant, evidence from Lord Ashcroft Polls
(2016) cite ‘gaining back control’ was the primary motivation to vote Leave, even if ironically
this is likely to increase the UK’s economic vulnerability (Froud et al. this volume).
As predicted the value of sterling plummeted, alongside a worse than expected manufacturing
slump (Khan, 2016). The Bank of England injected £3.1 billion into UK banks, ready to provide
an additional £250 billion to backstop markets (Rodionova, 2016); subsequently interest rates
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were cut to bolster the economy. Negative economic consequences will affect Germany, whose
foreign trade with the UK amounted to over e89 billion in 2015, the UK being their third most
important trading partner after the USA and France (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2016). Smaller
more vulnerable countries dependent on trade with the UK, like the Irish Republic, have been
described as sitting in the passenger seat of the Brexit car crash (Fingleton, 2016). For many the
prospects are bleak; for others this is an opportunity to create new economic and social institu-
tions for the digital age (Colin, 2016) and embolden progressive movements (Fazi , 2016).
Looking for concepts to help us analyse and understand the causes and consequences of
the Brexit vote I draw on some of the interpretations we made of the financial crisis of 2008,
using the concept of ‘fault lines’ and the Polanyian concept of a double movement (O’Reilly
et al., 2011). These concepts draw attention to the fractured coalitions supporting leave, and
the extent to which this can be seen as a reaction to protect against the negative impacts of
globalization and neo-liberalism.
1. Socio-economic Fault lines
The concept of ‘fault lines’ used by the economist Rajan (2010) identified deeply embedded
flaws in the international system of financial regulation that caused the 2008 financial crisis.
His seminal article Has Financial Development Made the World Riskier? (Rajan, 2005) was the
first to predict the financial crisis. He argued that accentuated risk taking by financial interme-
diaries had generated enormous wealth and access to finance. But this behaviour exacerbated
fluctuations: the risks taken made their organizations and subsequently private households
financially more interdependent and vulnerable. Rajan (2010) proposed greater control and
more prudent supervision was necessary so that ‘market friendly’ policies would reduce the
incentives for intermediaries to take excessive risks. At the time he was ignored because govern-
ment regulation of the sector was too closely tied to the interests of the large financial organiza-
tions benefitting from these risky and highly profitable transactions (Rajan, 2010, pp. 180–81).
David Cameron’s political risk taking with a ‘dash of Bullingdon hubris’, and a series of unex-
pected outcomes, like winning the 2015 general election, has some parallels with the profile of a
particularly powerful political class that Rajan identifies prior to the financial crisis.
But these elites have become increasingly fractured (Morgan this volume) and incapable
of effective action (Wood and Wright this volume). Froud et al. (this volume) suggest that
‘multiple interconnected economies’ have generated splintered economic experiences. These
cannot be simply read off in terms of a process of bifurcated class and immiseration, or the
unappreciated effects of European investment to compensate for the fundamental shifts in
the structure of employment (Warhurst this volume). These variegated distinctions and
experiences are discussed by Grey (this volume) in terms of ‘cosmopolitans’ and ‘locals’.
Locals represent a ‘contradictory coalition’ of communities combining ‘elements of national-
ist traditionalism with economic globalization’ cutting across traditional political divides.
The Brexit referendum unveiled a growing disjuncture between a politically divided popula-
tion and the institutions failing to represent and protect them.
2. The referendum results
The Brexit ‘fault lines’ of political and social divisions cut across regions, generations, class and
ethnic cleavages in a visibly disunited kingdom. The results have been well established and
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discussed (Ashcroft and Culwick, 2016): Scotland voted Remain; Northern Ireland was divided,
and England and Wales voted Leave. Support for Remain was strongest in the major cities of
England and weakest in the provinces (BBC, 2016a). Older voters were more likely to have
voted Leave while nearly three quarters (73%) of 18- to 24-year olds voted Remain; although a
lot less young people turned out to vote. The university educated voted Remain and those who
had left school at 18 years or younger voted Leave. Most people with children aged 10 years or
under voted Remain; while most of those with children aged 11 years or older voted Leave. A
majority of those working full- or part-time voted Remain; whereas most of those are not work-
ing, because they were unemployed, retired or ‘inactive’ voted Leave (Lord Ashcroft Polls,
2016). Leave voters were, as Grey points out, a motley coalition.
A frequently held interpretation has been that the Remain campaign lost in the tradi-
tional, disaffected and deindustrialized Labour heartlands of the North and among the
working class. But Williams (2016) argues it was not quite a simple as that: most Leave vot-
ers, apart from London, were from the south. High proportions of Leave votes were regis-
tered in traditional industrial areas in the Midlands and the North East; but the highest
proportion of Leave voters came from more rural locations and from the south-west and the
south in general as illustrated by the electoral map of results (BBC, 2016a).
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Nearly two thirds of manual workers (64%) voted Leave, and their voice was augmented
by approximately half of the middle classes who also voted Leave; a majority of the profes-
sionals and managerial classes voted Remain (57%). Looking at housing characteristics of
Leave voters illustrates this unusual ‘contradictory coalition’. Those who owned their own
home, without a mortgage (most probably older voters and the very rich), and two thirds of
council and housing association tenants voted Leave; homeowners with a mortgage voted
Remain (Lord Ashcroft Polls, 2016).
Gender divisions were not evident, but ethnic divisions were; and they were also frac-
tured. White voters were slightly more likely to vote Leave (53%) than to vote Remain
(47%). Two thirds (67%) of those describing themselves as Asian voted to remain, as did
three quarters (73%) of black voters. Nearly 6 in 10 (58%) of those describing themselves
as Christian voted to leave while 7 in 10 Muslims voted Remain. However, some migrants
from the Commonwealth who voted Leave did so because they wanted a fairer system of
migration that did not give preferential treatment to East Europeans over people from their
own countries (Parveen, 2016).
Brexit unveiled fault lines in the fractured face of class divisions in the UK. It revealed
unexpected alliances of shared opinion mobilized around an over simplified and highly emo-
tional in-out choice. It cut across business elites (Morgan this volume), regional economies
(Froud et al. this volume), local and cosmopolitan identities (Grey this volume) and employ-
ment statuses (Warhurst this volume).
3. Political Fault lines
But these fault lines among voters are not limited to the UK. ‘Soft’ and ‘hard’ forms of
Euroscepticism range from disenchantment with the European project to outright opposi-
tion (Szczerbiak and Taggert, 2008a,b). Political contagion from Brexit has yet to be felt in
the extent to which it will bolster right-wing populist movements across Europe (Emmerson
et al., 2016; Stokes et al., 2016; Rona-Tas this volume). The evidence to date has been
mixed. The Spanish elections in June resulted in a hung parliament and disappointing sup-
port for the anti-austerity Podemos; the right-wing Alternative for Germany (AfD) delivered
a stinging defeat to Merkel in local elections in September; but Viktor Orban’s October
referendum opposing EU refugee quotas was humiliatingly boycotted by Hungarian voters
with less than a 50% turnout (Economist, 2016b). There has been a significant and visible
rise in the radical right in many of these countries (Economist, 2016a; Le Gale`s and Rona-
Tas this Discussion Forum), but recent evidence indicates that there is also considerable sup-
port for the EU from Polish and Hungarian voters, while Greek, French and Spanish voters
are less favourably disposed (Stokes, 2016).
There has been a growing level of dissatisfaction with the handling of the economic and
the migrant crisis, and limited support for a closer union (Frerichs and Sankari this
Discussion Forum). There is evidence of a growing inward looking public opinion focused
on domestic issues especially from those on the political right (Stokes et al., 2016). Although
many also want the EU to play a more active international role in the future, this interna-
tionalist stance has the strongest support in Germany and Sweden. In contrast the French
are more despondent, as their international position has declined.
This perception of the effect of changing international status is also echoed in Grob-
Fitzgibbon’s (2016) analysis of the UK. He argues that the unreconciled longings for the loss
Brexit: understanding the socio-economic origins and consequences 811
of Empire and post-imperial nostalgia are where we find the roots of Eurosceptism in
Britain. Nearly half (49%) of Leave voters said the main reason for their choice was about
sovereignty: ‘the principle that decisions about the UK should be taken in the UK.’ One third
(33%) said that leaving ‘offered the best chance for the UK to regain control over immigra-
tion and its own borders’. Leavers saw more threats than opportunities to their standard of
living from the way the economy and society are changing—and they felt that opportunities
for their children had deteriorated. Leave voters were more likely than Remain voters to see
multiculturalism, feminism, the Green movement, globalization and immigration as forces
for ill (Lord Ashcroft Polls, 2016).
Polanyi outlined in the Great Transformation how the destructive forces of laissez faire
liberalism encountered a counter reaction from unions and socialist parties to protect vulner-
able groups from the potentially destructive outcomes of markets. We are currently at a
point of rapid transformation where multidimensional crises challenge the post-war neo-lib-
eral economic order; these challenges emerge from changing labour markets, welfare states
and financial markets reforms (Colin and Palier, 2015). As traditional political affiliations
are weakening, the distinction between left and right becomes increasingly blurred and the
legitimacy of political institutions and parties is being questioned. The attitude of Leave vot-
ers and the strapline on their campaign ‘take back control’ clearly reflects an anxiety with
the rapid transformations changing the complexion and structure of society. The Leave vote
was not just a protest against the political establishment in Westminster and Brussels, but
also a naı¨ve desire to re-establish some form of ‘protective’ control. This could be interpreted
as reflecting the sentiment associated with the double movement (Polanyi, 1957 [1944]
2001), but as Stiglitz argues in his forward to The Great Transformation: ‘rapid transforma-
tion destroys old coping mechanisms, old safety nets, while it creates a new set of demands,
before new coping mechanisms are developed’ (p. xi). The Brexit vote unveiled how these
new coping mechanisms are currently missing.
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The Brexit vote has highlighted economic divisions within the UK which have been neglected
partly because of conventional ways of thinking about one national economy measured in
terms of GDP. This predominant understanding of the economy as a manageable, unitary
entity came out of the external conflict of World War II; and the internal divisions revealed
by the Brexit vote should now stimulate a new kind of thinking about how there is more
than one economy. When British voters are not living in one economy that diffuses standard
outcomes, GDP as a sociotechnical form of quantification fails to capture the multiplicities
that require a new approach to management.
The idea of the unitary, manageable national economy is, as Mitchell (1998,2002) has
demonstrated, an invention of recent date. It links to GDP as the quantitative measure that
comes out of the World War II, when economic mobilization in the USA and UK required
management calculations of national full employment activity levels (Fioramonti, 2013;
Coyle, 2014). The policy instruments of activity management have changed in the past 50
years as fiscal policy and various kinds of corporatism have been displaced by monetary pol-
icy of an increasingly experimental kind with measures such as quantitative easing (QE).
But, jobs and GDP growth remain the superordinate policy objectives for Governor Carney
and the Bank of England, as they were for the British Treasury in the 1960s.
Many critics have rightly argued that GDP and jobs are (marketable) activity measures
not (social) welfare measures, but few have questioned the unitary economy framing and the
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underlying assumption that we do (or should) live in one economy. If prosperity does not
trickle down, the policy response within the unitary frame has been to promote inclusive
growth which will benefit disadvantaged people and places by raising their incomes towards
the mean, usually by bringing jobs.
From centre-left, Piketty’s (2014) Capital diagnoses increasing inequality caused by
returns to capital higher than the growth rate and prescribes the remedy of progressive
national taxation to redistribute income and wealth. From the ordo-liberal right, Glaeser’s
(2012) Triumph of the City is a paean to the power of agglomeration in cities and thereby
supports the standard policies of investing in infrastructure and upgrading skills to extend
the internal labour market and attract mobile capital to create the jobs. Through such poli-
cies, the GDP national economy measure (and the related GVA regional economy measure)
have performative power because they guide policy initiatives which mobilize resources.
But the measures also disclose the fact that 2:1 GVA per capita differences are long estab-
lished or increasing, regionally between London and Wales or the North East England, and
intra regionally between Manchester City and outer boroughs like Oldham within the
Greater Manchester area. That is not because standard policies have not been pressed hard
enough but because socio-economic relations have changed in ways that make both the
GDP measure and the one economy assumption obsolete.
In the 1950s and 1960s, new categories of activity measurement meshed with co-existing
social relations around large-scale (male) factory employment at standard wages. The lead-
ing sector was UK manufacturing which, in the mid-1960s, supplied 90% of the domestic
market, exported 20% of output (Williams et al., 1983) and diffused prosperity by employ-
ing 5–6 million; the anchor institutions were the giant public company and the nationalized
corporation paying standard wages for unionized, full-time, secure employment with a
defined benefit pension at the end.
The context of the 2010s is very different.
 Manufacturing now means imports of goods and labour. The UK has a trade deficit of
7% of GDP with no sustained increase in real manufacturing output since the 1970s
(Froud et al., 2011). Manufacturing employs no more than 8% of the workforce, the larg-
est sub-sector is food processing and one third of manufacturing process operatives are
foreign born (The Migration Observatory, 2015).
 Large-scale factory employment has collapsed and incidentally weakened private sector
trade unionism so that no more than 15% of private sector workers are unionised. There
are now fewer than 2000 factory establishments employing more than 200 workers in the
UK. The average British owned manufacturing firm employs less than 10; while one third
of UK employment is in micro firms employing an average of less than 2 (Froud et al.,
2011).
 Informalization is everywhere: 15% of workers are classed as self-employed after a one
million increase in the self-employed workforce over the past 10 years; some 800 000
workers are officially on zero-hours contracts and the number is currently increasing by
100 000 per annum.
This is partly, as Warhurst argues in this Discussion Forum, about bad jobs but socio-
politically it is more about the emergence of an increasingly unprotected and disaffiliated
working class with no connection to any kind of industrial and political labour movement.
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Before the Brexit vote, this was sociologically observed as the rise of the precariat.
Afterwards we have had a political panic about the other Britain: the UK has now joined
other high-income countries with insurgent populisms and increasingly unbiddable elector-
ates threatening the post democratic status quo, as described by Crouch (2004).
Significantly, in response to the Brexit vote, many reached for binary ‘them and us’ socio-
cultural explanations, echoed in some of the contributions to this issue. The psephologists
showed that working class ‘leave’ voters were observably older, socially conservative, nati-
vists with very different attitudes from younger, educated, socially liberal, big city cosmopol-
itans who voted to ‘remain’ (Ford, 2016). This difference of attitudes clearly relates to more
material differences. Because, as Neil Fligstein (2008) argued some years ago, social class
position in the EU has correlated empirically with participation in, and perceived benefits
from the EU project.
The ‘left behind’ trope has been widely used to explain the places and groups that voted
leave (because they were not getting their share of GDP). For John Lanchester (2016), ‘leave’
was the option of places disadvantaged by structural change: seaside resorts which lost their
role with cheap flights; coalfields where the good jobs went with pit closure; and knocked
about factory towns like Oldham in north-east Greater Manchester. Andy Haldane (2016),
in his Port Talbot speech after the Brexit vote, lays out multiple differences between different
socio-economic groups using standard indicators and comes to the conclusion that recovery
from the post-2008 recession had not done enough for the many, especially the young.
Those who gained income and assets under the old order have houses and pension rights;
while one quarter of 21- to 34-year olds now live with their parents (Haldane, 2016).
And all this is true: as we have noted elsewhere the top 20% of (non-retired) UK house-
holds captured nearly half of the nominal income gains from 1979 to 2010 (Brill et al.,
2014). But there is another story here which is about something other than income. As
Haldane (2016) notes, reassuring indicators of recovery in income/GDP, jobs and wealth
did not square with food banks distributing more and NGOs reported increasing homeless-
ness. ‘The language of recovery simply did not fit their facts’ as disclosed by visits using the
Bank’s system of regional agents which long predated GDP measures. And much standard
policy appears to be irrelevant or meaningless for voters. The EU provided regional aid for
infrastructure projects like new roads which did not buy the gratitude and loyalty of voters
in places like Blaenau Gwent or Cornwall.
The structural changes of the past 40 years have been as much about dismantling a social
settlement as about deindustrialization and that process of dismantling is not captured by
standard income statistics. The median income of pensioners is within 7% of those in work
so that the Guardian talks jokingly of ‘peak pensioner’ (Collinson, 2016); but in England
between 2009 and 2015 the number of old people receiving home visits, under local author-
ity funded domiciliary care schemes, declined by some 20% and home visits are now
rationed so that only the most infirm are eligible (Burns et al., 2016). How can we under-
stand these discrepant facts without reading them simply as a macroeconomic policy mis-
take by a Treasury committed to spending cuts?
One good starting point would be to jettison the unitary economy assumption which
leads to regret about persistent large differences in GVA, disappointment about the non-
diffusion of income, wealth and decent jobs and puzzlement about discrepant facts. If we
want to begin to understand multiple economies and how they can be managed, we need to
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turn back from economics to historians like Fernand Braudel who recognized that there is
more than one economy.
Partly in opposition to the post-1950s rewriting of economic history as the history of
economic growth, Fernand Braudel (1981,1982) in his history of the early-modern period
distinguished three levels: an everyday economy of subsistence and make-do, which was
partly outside the market economy that was disconnected from high finance and long dis-
tance trade. Economic history is then about the interference between these levels as the mar-
ket expands and Europe develops world economies. The Braudelian question for our own
time is how we would now distinguish different economies and analyse their mutual
interference.
The aim should not be a taxonomy of economies, but an understanding of the difference
between zones, the identification of welfare-critical zones where outcomes matter to all citi-
zens, and an understanding of each zone’s history, internal logic and intrication with others.
From this point of view, our main interest is in what we call the ‘foundational economy’
(Bowman et al., 2014), which distributes essential goods and services consumed by the
whole population through networks and branches: health, education and care, pipe and
cable utilities, transport, retail banking and food distribution.
The foundational economy is big everywhere: in deindustrialized Liverpool it employs
more than 40% of the work force; and in London it still accounts for 35%. It also has a tra-
jectory which is not captured in GDP cycles. Until 2010, government revenues were being
steadily applied to expand health and education so that more than half of all new jobs were
publicly funded under the Thatcher and Blair premierships (Buchanan et al., 2009). And the
foundational then took over from manufacturing as the diffuser of prosperity, often by put-
ting a female wage earner into a two income household. Many of those in publicly funded
jobs (or privatized monopoly utilities like gas or telecoms) still have decently paid secure
employment in school teaching, para medical or technician roles.
What remains is stable on the demand side but increasingly caught up in a supply-side
crisis. Demand is underwritten by the stable population base in areas like the Welsh valleys
where there is nothing like the large-scale interwar outmigration, when jobs and family
houses were available in the English midlands. But the foundational economy is increasingly
now in crisis and not simply because of austerity cuts in revenue. Outsourcing has degraded
pay and conditions in public service activities like residential adult care or prisons (Bowman
et al., 2015). While public company and private equity business models requiring 10% plus
returns lead to investment rationing in telecoms and pressure selling in retail banking
(Bowman et al., 2014).
More broadly the Braudelian idea of interference, gives us a new insight into the process
and outcomes of financialization. For example, present-day British informalization is sui
generis and quite unlike the long-established informalization in the global south.
Informalization (and much else like the churning of ownership) in the UK is being pressed
by organized money when publicly-owned companies are under pressure for shareholder
value and private equity operations are under pressure for a surplus over the cash cost of
bonds. Under these pressures, the foundational economy is the dragging sheet anchor of
welfare.
Brexit is going to be a right mess: as Morgan argues in this issue, British elites are divided
and we would add that the centrist political classes in the main parties are caught between
organized business which wants market access and an electorate which wants controls on
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immigration. But some good would come from Brexit if they began to realize that GDP and
the unitary economy is an invention of recent date which is reaching its end. Because this
would open up new and constructive possibilities of economic management for controlling
informalization, curbing financial engineering in low risk and low return activities and
securing foundational provision.
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1. Sureties, surprises and the sidestepping of a problem of the
government’s making
On June 23, 2016, on a turnout of 72.2% of those eligible to vote, a small majority (51.9%
vs 48.1%) in UK’s EU referendum voted to leave the EU. UK people will now no longer be
citizens of the EU but tourists and visitors to it. However it was an accidental exit. The refer-
endum was called by UK Prime Minister David Cameron to appease his own party’s rebel-
lious backbench MPs. But Brexit was not the intended outcome. Cameron only triggered the
referendum because he thought the Government would win it. Neither the Remain nor
Leave camps seriously thought that the UK would vote anything other than Remain.
Neither camp had any plans for anything else. For the Government there was no Plan B and
for Brexiteers there was no Plan A.
Much has been made of a disconnect between Westminster and those who voted to leave
as a key reason underpinning the result and the Government’s miscalculation. There is some
truth in this claim. While much has been said about the propensity of older voters to vote
leave, the largest ratio by demographic was for the lowest skilled, voting 70–30% to leave
(with an almost inverse ratio for the highest skilled voters, 32% vs 68%, among whom of
course are most MPs).1
Although the government argued an economic case for staying in the EU, that case was
based on the price of exiting. ‘The UK’, Chancellor George Osborne (2016, p. 9) declared,
‘would be permanently poorer if it left the EU’. His and the Government’s widely publicized
1 https://yougov.co.uk/news/2016/06/27/how-britain-voted/.
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claim that every family in the UK would be £4300 worse off if the UK left the EU was the
obvious example. What Osborne could not talk was about the current price being paid by
those families as a result of the Government’s prolonged pursuit of austerity and a recovery
driven by the creation of ever more bad jobs. In contrast, although some (often knowingly
spurious) financial case was made for leaving the EU, the Brexiteers’ real dog-whistle issue
was immigration into the UK. UKIP’s now infamous poster portraying migrants on the
march was merely a pictorial condensing of the argument. On this issue the Government
was vulnerable. It too had long proclaimed migration to be a problem in need of control and
reduction. However, 6 years in power, it had failed to do so. It tried to avoid the issue during
the referendum, leaving the Brexiteers’ spin on immigration mostly unchallenged. However
outside the political posturing and in the real economy, the two issues had created a toxic
mix: too many UK workers jostling with immigrants at the deteriorating bottom of the
labour market.
2. Unpacking the toxic mix
Since the global financial crisis, the UK’s employment rate has risen but real wages have
fallen. Over 2007–15 the drop has been 10.4%—the worst, along with Greece, among the
leading OECD countries. Over the same period in Germany real wages have risen 23%. The
OECD average is 6.7% growth (TUC, 2016). Moreover by 2015 around 20% of jobs in the
UK paid less than the voluntary living wage—then set at £9.15 in London and £7.85 else-
where in the UK (TUC, 2015).
However there are more subtle changes to the UK labour market as measured by pay, as
data from Eurofound2 reveals. Using pay as a proxy for job quality then dividing the pay
range of jobs into quintiles and charting the expansion and contraction of the number and
proportion of jobs in each quintile over time, Eurofound has been assessing employment
restructuring in Member States of the EU. Three developments are revealed for the UK: job
polarization, increased non-standard employment generally and among the worst paid jobs,
and UK-born workers benefitting less from employment restructuring.
Undoubtedly job creation has been strong in the UK post-crisis; almost every quarter the
UK Government’s Office for National Statistics (ONS) has reported a record high in the
number of jobs (https://www.ons.gov.uk/). The type of jobs being created though is worry-
ing. Unlike many other EU Member States and the EU overall, the UK labour market shows
a stubborn trend of polarization, making the UK economy one of good and bad jobs by pay.
Even more worryingly, an asymmetrical polarization has emerged recently, skewed towards
the creation of the worst jobs (Quintiles 1 and 2), as Figure 1 reveals. This trend dates back
as far back as the 1970s (Eurofound, 2015) and, with it, wage inequality in the UK (as meas-
ured by the Gini index) has become so great since 2008 that it distorts the EU average; strip-
ping out the UK results, the EU average ‘remained more or less stable’ according to
Eurofound (2016b, p. 78).
2 Eurofound is the agency for improving living and working conditions in the EU.
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There have also been subtle shifts in the types of employment created since the crisis,
with the creation of more ‘non-standard’ jobs as opposed to what Eurofound terms ‘core
employment’ (2016b, p. 23). As Figure 2 shows, permanent, full-time jobs have been lost,
replaced by part-time and self-employment. Over half of UK jobs growth to 2014 was
accounted for by self-employment. In the 3 months prior to the referendum, 88% of new
‘jobs’ were created through self-employment. It is this self-employment that keeps unem-
ployment low in the UK (ONS, 2016b).
Self-employment now accounts for 15% of the UK workforce. Construction workers,
taxi drivers/chauffeurs and carpenters/joiners were the ‘top 3 roles’ (ONS, 2014). As the
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ONS has recognized more recently, the growth of self-employment since the crisis is an out-
come of the flight from unemployment and a shift from other forms of employment. Much
of the latter is enforced. For example, since the economic crisis the number of jobs in public
sector education increased by 5% but the number of self-employed jobs in education rose by
58%. A similar pattern has occurred in health. What is significant is that this self-
employment is provided through temporary work agencies which have contracts to provide
temporary not permanent positions, with workers filling the posts having to be registered as
self-employed to be eligible for placement (Cribb et al., 2014; Coulter, 2016).3 Significantly,
average earnings for the self-employed are low. Average weekly earnings (excluding
bonuses) for employees was £450 a week in June 2014; for the self-employed £207 a week
and falling over 20% since the crisis (ONS, 2014). As Frances O’Grady, General Secretary
of the UK’s trade union umbrella organization the TUC, has remarked:
While it is good to see more people in work, the huge increase is self-employment raises questions
about the nature of those jobs. These newly self-employed workers are not all budding entrepre-
neurs. Many don’t chose self-employment, being forced onto contracts with fewer rights, less pay
and no job security. (quoted in Farrell, 2016, np)
This development is most apparent in the bottom quintile of UK jobs. While the majority of
good jobs as measured by pay that have been created over 2011–2015 are also good in
terms of status—being full-time and permanent—the majority of jobs created in the bottom
quintile are temporary, part-time and self-employed, as Figure 3 shows.
3 I am grateful to Lorraine Johnson of IER for this material.
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Among the employed, zero hours contracts have proliferated. Although measurement of
it can be difficult, by the end of 2015, the ONS estimated that just over 800 000 workers
were employed on zero hours contracts. These contracts offer no guaranteed working hours
and, as a consequence, no income stability for workers, thereby undermining any possibility
of a planned life around a solid wage floor. Moreover these jobs are not necessary
temporary—well over half, 463 000, have been employed on these contracts for more than
a year, some more than 5 years (ONS, 2016a).
In addition, who works in jobs in the bottom quintile is emerging as a problem in the
UK. Immigration within the EU is significant: in 2015 around 26 million workers or 12% of
workers were born in a country different to that in which they now live and work. It
increased by two million over 2011–2015. Within the EU most flows come from the new,
poorer EU Member States to the old, richer ones (Eurofound, 2016a). By 2015 just over
10% of the UK workforce was not born in the UK (ONS, 2015). These workers spread
across the quintiles over 2011–2015 but the largest proportion was employed in the bottom
quintile—accounting for just over 20% of workers here (Eurofound, 2016b).
As Figure 4 shows, across the EU and in the UK, native workers (those born in the
reporting country) have benefited most from good jobs growth in the top quantile. But there
are also differences. Across the EU generally, native workers have tended to shift from the
lower quintile jobs; in contrast in the UK many native workers continue to work in these
jobs. A bad jobs trap thus still exists in the UK (cf. Booth and Snower, 1996). Almost three-
quarters of workers who were low paid in 2002 were still low paid in 2012 (Hurrell, 2013).
Moreover jobs growth in UK intermediate jobs, those in the middle quintile and which
include skilled work, is almost exclusively dominated by non-native workers. In pursuit of a
knowledge-driven economy in the UK over the past 20 years, higher education has been
boosted at the expense of the vocational education that underpins many of the intermediate
jobs (Warhurst and Thompson, 2006; Anderson, 2009). With no springboard up into better
jobs, UK natives are benefitting less from employment restructuring and are more likely than
in the EU generally to be employed in the same quintile of bad jobs as non-native workers.
Whether competition between these workers is direct or indirect, the poorest, least skilled
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UK workers with little hope of advancement might feel that their cake, such as it is, is now
having to be shared with new immigrants.
3. A change gonna come?
Brexit may have been accidental but it was an accident waiting to happen. Jobs have been
created in the UK post-crisis but the quality of those jobs has been ignored by government.
Too many bad jobs are being created and which, in themselves, are also getting worse.
Moreover too many UK born workers are getting stuck in these jobs alongside migrant
workers to the UK. Although the analysis presented here is crude and the data need closer
examination, it is reasonable to suggest that this toxic mix of developments might explain
the Brexit vote of the lowest skilled.
The morning after the night before, the reaction of many to the Brexit result was to seek
to have the referendum rerun: over 4 million people signed a petition asking for a second
referendum.4 Others wanted to have the referendum result side-lined, citing it to be merely
advisory and wanting Parliament to assert its sovereignty and ignore it. These demands deny
the voice and disaffection of the low skilled, drawn from their current experience of
employment.
There are signs that government is now listening. Replacing Cameron and sacking
Osborne, in her first speech as the new UK Prime Minister, Teresa May, recognized that ‘If
you’re from an ordinary working class family, life is much harder than many people in
Westminster realise’. Her government, she said, will ‘be driven, not by the interests of the
privileged few but by yours’ (quoted in Perkins, 2016). Policies have yet to be developed that
might translate into practice and evidence May’s commitment to helping the disaffected who
voted for Brexit. However words have affect; first, a yardstick has been created by which to
measure the new UK Government’s policies and their outcomes; second, space has opened
up for ideas centred on making bad jobs better and the ways in which that might be done.
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Any cursory search on the internet will rapidly reveal the common trope that the Brexit vote
was ‘a mutiny against the cosmopolitan elite’ as Craig Calhoun, the Director of the LSE,
wrote in the Huffington Post on the June 27. Time headlined its report on June 24th ‘the
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Brexit vote is a new milestone in the global war on elites’. The vision of a revolt of the
masses against the elite has permeated much analysis of the Brexit result.
In contrast, many social scientists have been sceptical about the idea of a homogeneous
elite that is capable of acting in a unified way on a consistent and coherent basis. Pareto in
his classic discussion focused on the idea of circulation of elites and conflicts within elites
between ‘lions’ who were men (sic) capable of decisive and forceful action and ‘foxes’ who
were imaginative, innovative and unscrupulous (Parry, 2005). For elites to be successful,
they had to combine the characteristics of both lions and foxes; if the elite lacked decisive
leaders or more innovative leaders, or alternatively if the two segments drifted apart, the
danger was that the elite would be unable to adapt to crises and challenges, leading to a
period of chaos as these different parts of the elite sought to assert their control by building
new alliances.
While the idea of Cameron and Osborne as ‘lions’ may seem far-fetched, as many com-
mentators have pointed out, Cameron was decisive in committing to a referendum on EU
membership. He may have been deluded to think that he could guarantee a positive outcome
but there is no doubt that in making the decision, he took forceful action which he believed
would succeed. On the other hand, the idea of Johnson, Gove etc. as foxes seems very apt;
they were unscrupulous in their use of statistics and in their rejection of the use of ‘experts’,
while steadfastly refusing to commit to any particular vision of the UK post-Brexit. The
speed with which they shuffled or were shuffled off the stage in the immediate aftermath of
their unexpected victory reflected a certain fox-like stealth, even if Johnson has now
returned as Foreign Secretary.
These ‘foxes’, however, were part of the elite, not populist leaders emerging spontane-
ously from the crowd. Gove and Johnson were two Oxford educated Tories with long-term
connections to the party, its media supporters and its leading figures such as Cameron reach-
ing back for decades. Nigel Farage, self-styled ‘man of the people’ attended the prestigious
independent school, Dulwich College, and followed his father into the City, trading com-
modities for 20 years.
However, to see the Brexit conflict in terms of a small coterie of people and their con-
trasting personal ambitions would be to mistake the symptoms for the cause. In the 1975
Referendum on maintaining membership in the European Economic Community (EEC), the
only exiteers were a few renegade Tories hankering after Empire such as Enoch Powell in
alliance with the Labour Left led by Tony Benn who wanted to build ‘socialism in one coun-
try’. In 1975, business was solidly behind the EEC. The Confederation of British Industry
(CBI) polled its 12 000 members and reportedly only eight wanted to leave. Many of the
others funded the EEC campaign and actively proselytized the cause among their own work-
ers. In contrast, business and elite support for staying in the EU was not unanimous in 2016.
In May, 2016, 300 ‘business leaders’ called for Brexit in a letter to the Daily Telegraph. The
CBI representing large firms was strongly pro-Remain reflecting the preferences of most but
not all its members. However, less than one third of FTSE 100 companies signed the notori-
ous letter in favour of Remain, which Downing Street engineered at the beginning of the
referendum campaign in February 2016 and many large companies including Barclays, RBS,
Sainsburys and Tesco declared their neutrality. The British Chambers of Commerce (BCC)
were officially ‘neutral’ though its director-general, John Longworth, spoke in favour of
Brexit which led to him being forced to resign.
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Even in the City of London, where the Bank of England spelt out the dangers of Brexit
and many large banks supported Remain to defend business dependent on the ‘EU passport’,
there were voices of opposition. The Guardian reported on November 6, 2015 that many
Mayfair-based hedge funds were ‘backing Brexit with both words and cash’. The Wall
Street Journal, on June 19, 2016, reported that the hedge fund industry was split but that
Brexit was favoured by many. Reasons were concerns over future EU regulation of hedge
funds and their activities as well as a more short-term belief that the volatility arising in
many markets consequent on UK exit from the EU would provide plenty of profit opportu-
nities for speculators—which indeed it did. In the print media, support for Brexit was exten-
sive reflecting the long-term resentment of the EU and its possible impact on ownership of
the newspapers and TV stations by UK press barons such as Murdoch.
What this points to is a partial fragmentation of the UK elite over the past 40 years,
which goes beyond issues of personal ambition among a small number of politicians.
Between 1975 and the first EEC referendum and the second 2016 referendum lies a pro-
found change in British society and in its economic structure as it shifted unevenly but inex-
orably from a muddled form of corporatism to neo-liberalism (Crouch, 1977; Crouch,
2009; Crouch, 2011). A crucial part of this shift has been a change in the nature of the eco-
nomic elite (Froud et al., 2007; Savage and Williams, 2008; Morgan, 2015; Morgan, 2016)
due to the expansion of the City of London as a financial centre, the impact of globalization,
the defeat of organized labour and the deep penetration of the state by commercial forces
(Crouch, 2016). These changes are reflected most profoundly in the growing inequality that
has occurred over the same period as the very wealthy have become more and more distinc-
tive in terms of their wealth and income while a larger part of the population has moved to
more precarious employment with stagnating real incomes and declining state benefits
(Piketty, 2014; Flaherty, 2015; Dorling, 2015; Atkinson, 2015).
This lack of cohesion is reinforced at the corporate level. In the USA, Mizruchi (2013)
has described the ‘fracturing of the corporate elite’ in the following terms: ‘From a group
with a moderate pragmatic orientation, the corporate elites was now reduced to a collection
of firms, powerful in their ability to gain specific benefits for themselves but no longer able
or willing to address issues of concern to the larger business community or the larger society’
(Mizruchi, 2013, p. 269). Mizruchi traces this back to the shareholder value revolution
pushing managers to focus on shareholder returns, rendering the American corporate elite
‘incapable of addressing the kinds of issues that it had routinely tackled in the postwar
period’ (Mizruchi, 2013, p. 226). While Washington DC is full of lobbyists, they are
employed by corporates in very instrumental ways to protect and further their interests
rather than to develop a political consensus on the big issues. Similar pressures on UK busi-
ness have been powerful; the overwhelming requirement to focus on shareholder returns at
the expense of any broader commitment to societal welfare is clear and fed the unwillingness
to commit wholesale to the business case for Remain. The way in which long-established
banks such as the Royal Bank of Scotland, Barclays, Lloyds etc. behaved in the period lead-
ing up to and since the financial crash shows a total disregard for anything other than short-
term rewards for executives and shareholders. Recent disclosures on LIBOR, the PPI scan-
dal, the use of tax havens and tax evasion, the manipulation of financial capital e.g. at
British Homes Stores, the widespread use of zero hours contracts and avoiding minimum
wage legislation e.g. as at Sports Direct reinforce the idea that a public interest concern has
long been abandoned in many British companies.
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It is in this context that the politics of Brexit can be understood. Cameron mistakenly
believed there was still a sufficiently cohesive elite which would support him and which
would help him persuade the public in the referendum. But in spite of the fact that that elite
had benefited so much from the policies of the last 30 years, it lacked an interest in or a
capacity for playing such a role. Instead the opportunity arose for the foxes in the elite to
mobilize popular concerns about immigration, austerity and alienation from the political
class and to focus them on Brexit as a solution without actually spelling out what that meant
in practice. Under the heading of Brexit, ideological divisions within an elite that remained
supportive of neo-liberalism but held to different interpretations (e.g. as described in (Ban,
2016)) of how that needed to be sustained and developed in the current UK context and in
the light of the crisis of the Eurozone and the global economy had not only come to the sur-
face but had also activated a broad mass of the population. The simple choice proposed in
the referendum campaign enabled the Brexiteers, to their own surprise in many cases, to call
forth and energize a large and increasingly volatile section of the electorate that had previ-
ously been alienated from politics often by reason of 30 years of growing inequality and
powerlessness but were now determined to make their voices heard. What had been dis-
agreement within the elite, within the ‘Westminster bubble’ was now out in society as a
whole, creating a new and uncertain situation for the foreseeable future. The expectations of
the triumphant Brexiteer electorate are not going to be easily reconciled with the interests of
big business in retaining access to the European Single Market.
Elites can lose control of societies because their disagreements spill out into the wider
society. These moments when the splits become visible are often the first sign of the weaken-
ing of an existing order because they awaken other social actors from taking for granted
their subordination and instead encourage them to act on the political stage (Dunn, 1989;
Skocpol, 2015). Elites may mistakenly believe they can control this as the traditional
Conservatives did in Germany as they sought to use Hitler and rise of Nazism for their own
purposes. But the resulting turmoil can lead in unpredictable directions, a situation that
energizes left- and right-wing forces but leaves the previously dominant elites confused and
struggling to regain their old legitimacy and dominance. In the current context, we can see
that as a cause for hope—the possible end of neo-liberalism—or as a cause for despair—the
potential rise of authoritarian populism.
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The EU Referendum result has dramatically foregrounded a series of shifts which have been
underway for some time, and in the process created a new and contradictory landscape which
will shape the organization of politics in the coming years. The class, educational, regional,
micro-regional and generational pattern of voting (Cutts, 2016; Lord Ashcroft Polls, 2016)
reveals an overarching distinction that can be framed in terms of that between what the sociol-
ogist Alvin Gouldner (1958) called ‘cosmopolitans and locals’. Gouldner developed these con-
cepts in the context of organizations, and they broadly denoted a distinction between those
‘locals’ whose primary identification and loyalty was with and to the organization they worked
for, and those ‘cosmopolitans’ who were relatively disengaged from the organization with
which they work and identified with external, professional reference groups.
Translated to the wider political context, cosmopolitans are educated and skilled, comfort-
able with different cultures, travel widely and have a global frame of reference. They most
likely voted to remain in the EU. Locals are poorly educated, travel little, feel uncomfortable
with difference and have a national or even regional frame of reference. They most likely voted
to leave the EU. Unsurprisingly, immigration is a key differentiator here, in two connected
ways. First, locals are more hostile to immigration because it disrupts national frames of refer-
ence and, second, they are less likely to have direct experience of immigrants. In contrast, cos-
mopolitans routinely interact with immigrants and are relaxed about immigration.
Like all political distinctions this one creates strange alliances and tensions, as indeed
Gouldner’s study showed, and yet for themselves and others these differences can be glossed
over so as to plausibly and meaningfully yield ‘us’ and ‘them’ distinctions. Thus cosmopoli-
tan remainers encompass big business, finance and the professions along with liberal and
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left-leaning intellectuals and internationalists, including ‘civic nationalists’ in Scotland. In
the eyes of local leavers these groups do indeed belong together (even if, as Morgan’s contri-
bution to this volume shows, from other perspectives they are fissured), and can all be sub-
sumed into an amorphous notion of ‘the elite’, whether that elite be ‘corporate’ or ‘liberal’.
This also explains how it is possible for leavers to denounce the EU as both a socialist super
state (‘the EUSSR’) and as a tool of global neo-liberalized capital.
The local leavers are also a diverse amalgam, running from the remnants of the industrial
working class through to empire-lamenting nationalists and hard left opponents of global
capital. They may also be collectively lumped together by remainers as backward-looking
and xenophobic. What is particularly striking is that the leaders of this group tend to be
ardent global free-marketeers, whose objection to the EU is that it is not global enough and
overly attached to employment rights and environmental standards. In this way, the leavers
are reminiscent of the Thatcherite coalition of the 1980s in contradictorily combining ele-
ments of nationalist traditionalism with economic globalization (see Krieger, 1986).
Indeed, it is ironic that it was the Thatcher regime which enacted and championed the
European single market which brought with it increased immigration and deeper political
integration. The Referendum result in some ways represents the long-term unwinding of the
consequences of the contradictions within Thatcherism. No less does it represent the conse-
quences of the New Labour administrations’ embrace of globalization on the back of a core
vote which was suspicious of or hostile to this but which, it was assumed, would remain
loyal to Labour (see Heffernan, 2001). All of these contradictions and tensions, which have
been building for years, have now been brought to a dramatic head by the Referendum.
Thus, crucially, the cosmopolitan-local distinction cuts right across traditional political
parties, so that a swathe of ‘pragmatic’ Tories and the liberal-left and ‘new labour’ segments
of the Labour party are cosmopolitan remainers, while nationalist and Eurosceptic Tories,
UKIP and many parts of ‘old Labour’ are local leavers. As a microcosm of this, the distinc-
tion also cuts through the Green party which divides between seeing the EU as providing an
international framework for tackling climate change or as undermining local and sustain-
able economies. Overall, the consequence of the Referendum has been to brutally expose the
disjuncture between the shape of political institutions and parties on the one hand and of
sociopolitical divisions among the electorate on the other.
What is therefore now in prospect is a truly remarkable and perhaps unprecedented sit-
uation. The Referendum was in a sense a defeat for what leavers call the elite or the estab-
lishment (ironic though this is considering the social background of its leaders). But it has
not displaced that establishment. On the contrary it is the business leaders, university lead-
ers, civil servants and—much derided in the campaign—experts who are now faced with
enacting a policy which, by and large, they did not vote for and do not agree with or even
think realistic. If the result was a revolution of the locals, it is a half-completed one which
the vanquished cosmopolitans are charged with delivering.
This has had an immediate effect and one which will define the contours of political
debate in the coming months and years. Although the vote was to ‘leave the EU’, neither the
ballot paper nor the leave campaign specified what leaving actually meant. The leave cam-
paigners themselves had very different views about this, the principle fault line being
between those who want what is now being called ‘Brexit-lite’, meaning remaining within
the single market, and those wanting ‘hard Brexit’ involving exiting the single market and
creating a free trade agreement with the EU (or trading under WTO terms). These models
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are often denoted in terms of the examples of Norway and Canada respectively (see Grey,
2015). Brexit-lite would almost certainly entail free movement of people, paying into the EU
budget and abiding by most EU rules with little input. Hard Brexit would avoid these but
have massive effects on, in particular, the UK service sector as well as on the viability of
British science, the land border between Northern Ireland and the EU (in terms of the
Republic of Ireland) and the likelihood of Scottish independence.
These two broad options are, like the EU decision itself, understandable as relatively cos-
mopolitan (Brexit-lite) or relatively local (hard Brexit), principally because of their different
effects on immigration. Given that it is the cosmopolitans who must enact the Referendum
result, there is therefore a strong impetus to Brexit-lite, and there will be intense lobbying
from powerful voices, especially in finance, for this. In this context, the parliamentary poli-
tics become very complex. The three ministers primarily charged with negotiating Brexit
were all part of the leave campaign but have, or appear to have, different views about what
Brexit means. Meanwhile, a sizeable minority of Tory backbenchers are implacably hostile
to Brexit-lite, although there is likely to be a cross-party parliamentary majority for it (given
that there is a majority for remaining in the EU), reflecting again the disjuncture between the
existing party system and the emergent political division.
The outcome of this is obviously unknowable at the present time, but the shape of the
political argument is clear enough, as are some of the consequences. The Referendum, partly
because the result was so close and partly because it voted against the EU but not for any-
thing definite, has not in any way settled the issue. If the outcome is Brexit-lite then there
will be vociferous cries of betrayal from leavers, and undoubtedly a surge in support for
anti-EU politicians. However, a hard Brexit would prove no less problematic for them given
that almost all informed opinion suggests the result would be highly economically damag-
ing, implying unemployment and public spending cuts. In these circumstances, which will
impact most upon local leavers, anti-immigrant and nationalist sentiment is also highly
likely to intensify.
As for cosmopolitan remainers, Brexit-lite might be a (barely) tolerable outcome but
hard Brexit would lead to bitter resentment and, precisely because of the global mobility of
many remainers, the departure of businesses and individuals from the UK. Gouldner’s work
is again illuminating here, suggesting that cosmopolitans are less loyal to their organizations
(or, here, countries) and that localism flourishes most in insecure and threatening circum-
stances (here, economic crisis). Thus, whichever Brexit model emerges, the underlying con-
flicts will persist.
Since the consequences of the Referendum will unfold over years, and probably decades,
and will impact upon all policy areas, it is quite possible that in time the party structures will
transform so as to reflect more closely the cosmopolitan-local distinction. This is made all
the more likely if it is indeed the case that it forms the basis of a durable and meaningful
sense of ‘us’ and ‘them’, as the heat of the campaign and its aftermath suggests may be so.
There has already been some talk of a new ‘centrist’ remain party or national coalition, and
there seems some likelihood that UKIP, or something like it, will build on the Referendum
result to displace Labour in its de-industrialized former heartlands, just as SNP civic nation-
alism has already displaced Labour in Scotland. Meanwhile, the division within the Tory
party over the EU, which has riven it for almost 30 years now, makes a split perfectly con-
ceivable. Thus the old structure of two main parties representing, roughly, capital and
labour that dominated the 20th century now seems precarious, if not doomed. Indeed, it has
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been frayed at the edges for some time as voting patterns have fragmented. What the
Referendum has done is to point, embryonically, to what the new structure might be; one
that directly and explicitly represents the underlying politics of a nation passionately split in
almost equal numbers between cosmopolitans and locals.
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In his searing novel of the violence at the heart of the building of the American West, Blood
Meridian, Cormack McCarthy depicts individuals who both relentlessly pursue their own
enrichment, and yet regularly engage in actions that are both inexplicable and self-
destructive. This raises the question as to the role of incompetence, misjudgment, opportun-
ism and failure at formative times of institutional building and change.
A focus on the distribution, rather than the efficiency, aspects of institutions highlights
their inherent fragility (Thelen, 2010, p. 54). Actors will constantly seek to test or renegoti-
ate any compromise, and there is the omnipresent threat of alternative or reformed coali-
tions of interests presenting themselves (Hall and Gingerich, 2009; Thelen, 2010, p. 54).
Meanwhile, historical institutionalism highlights the importance of power and politics
within institutional arrangements, which provide opportunities and constraints on social
action. Even in times of ‘critical juncture’, institutions and politics both evolve in ways that
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follow a particular logic, following on the structural context (Thelen, 2010, p. 55). Both
these approaches conceptualize attempts to change institutions as the product of logical
processes, representing either rational calculations or contextually logical products of histor-
ical circumstances.
Most strands of comparative institutional analysis stress the duality of institutions and
social action, with each influencing and remoulding the other, stretching back to the works
of Georg Simmel (Lane and Wood, 2009; Jackson, 2010); it is also generally considered that
social action constitutes a process that is at least partially reasoned and thought through.
Historical settings frame actors’ interests and actions: actors may both reinforce the rule
book and seek to depart from it (Jackson, 2010). The literature on comparative institutional
analysis has tended to focus on collective action by actors. However, it is recognized that
more coordinated settings strengthen collective ties within and between actors (Lane and
Wood, 2009). In liberal markets, where owner interests predominate, a greater range of
opportunities are presented for entrepreneurial actions by individual players (cf. Dore,
2008).
Actors can be seen as ‘creative political schemers’, rather than ‘acting out the parts the
theorist has set for them’ (Crouch, 2009, p. 87). However, the extent to which actors may
be incompetent or bungling in their schemes, and the extent to which such incompetence
and bungling may have far-reaching consequences for institutions is often underestimated.
Endogenous approaches to understanding systemic change suggest that continuity is secured
by ‘skillful’ actors who use their existential material and/or political advantages to prop up
and secure their positions; challengers seek to contest this in a ‘strategic dance’, character-
ized by shifting tactics (Fligstein and McAdam, 2012, p. 84). It could be argued that disor-
derly or chaotic change may represent not only shortfalls in capabilities and judgments on
the behalf of both agents of continuity and change. Exogenous conceptualizations of change
focus on relatively unusual external shocks; such circumstances open up particular opportu-
nities for ‘skillful’ actors to remake the system in their own interests (Fligstein and McAdam,
2012). Once they have secured their position, then the new order is rapidly bedded down.
However, a failure to capitalize on this opportunity may make for an extended period of dis-
orderly systemic flux. Beckert (2013) argues that in times of uncertainty, actors are particu-
larly likely to imagine or have fictional expectations about what the future may be like. With
fiction come narratives, which can become self-fulfilling; they serve the interest of the
speaker without necessarily mapping out an advisable path or ensuring future stability and
growth (Beckert, 2013). At the same time, the manner in which such narratives unfold may
represent a sharp departure from past trajectories; the choices made by actors may be diffi-
cult to predict.
Above all, Brexit should be seen in such a light. While it would be difficult to completely
deconstruct the actions of two key players, the former Prime Minister, David Cameron, and
the leader of the Brexit campaign, Boris Johnson, widely repeated theories in the media sug-
gest two dimensions. First, Cameron had embarked on the gamble of holding referendums
as a means of solving or kicking into the long grass persistent challenges or dilemmas; this
included electoral reform, the Scotland referendum and the Brexit one. Inevitably, as with a
gambler who tosses the dice one too many times, bad news presented itself. Secondly,
Johnson seems to have hoped to burnish his credentials with the Tory rank and file through
leading his campaign to a narrow defeat, without having to face up to the challenges Brexit
would bring. The outcome was one neither individual appears to have anticipated nor had
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plans to manage. Not only will Brexit fundamentally change the impact of supra-national
EU institutions on UK regulation and governance (with knock on effects on nested national
and sub-national institutions (cf. Boyer and Hollingsworth, 1997), but it also places into
renewed question the survival of the United Kingdom as a single political entity. The schem-
ing of more minor actors in this tragedy is an equally dismal story, but there are many more
subplots of miscalculation, wrong headedness, willful stupidity and petty treachery. Even
less inspiring is that some of the investors who lavishly funded the Brexit campaign were the
same who bet against the pound (Johnson et al., 2016), in other words, actively working to
bring about economic disruption to profit through it. Quite simply, British institutions will
undergo fundamental change, and this change has not been brought about by the rational
calculations of key actors, nor does it represent a successful example of premeditated
opportunism.
While Brexit was marked by elite failure and bungling, it was an elite that expressly
excluded the intellectual classes. This is not to suggest that, as with any other ideology, neo-
liberalism does not have its fair share of profits. However, an increasingly forceful political
narrative in Liberal Market Economies has been a disdain for intellectual thought, evidence-
based compromise and qualification (Rigney, 1991; Massey, 2000; cf. Etzioni, 2006). As
Priestland (2012) has pointed out, elites can be divided into three categories: the rich/owners
of capital, militarists and intellectuals. Only when the last are taken seriously—which nor-
mally only follows after a period when other two elite segments are completely discredited—
is there a basis for durable social compromises, and for political elites to be held properly to
account. The failure of the intellectual elite to make themselves heard above the noise of the
Brexit battle is part of a particularly worrisome trend. On one hand, it was an easy and
cheap shot for political elites arguing for Brexit to state that we have had enough of intellec-
tual elites in the form of experts [many of whom, as Grey (this issue) notes, probably now
have to enact a policy they did not vote for or believe is realistic]. Academics are rarely suc-
cessful in making their increasingly complex insights accessible to a mass audience, despite
increasing exhortations to be impactful beyond academia. This arises in part because much
academic energy is diverted to securing peer-reviewed publications, while even potential
informed readers are increasingly prepared to read only short digests conveying unambigu-
ous messages even if the research on which it is based does not support such an unequivocal
conclusion. On the other hand, in hankering after simplistic solutions for complex problems
by disregarding the insights of experts is a direction in which lies populism, the mob, and
worse. As such, the wider public are vulnerable to misinformation and downright lies pro-
mulgated by other elites. The relative weakness of intellectuals in Liberal Markets would
reflect the extent to which the other two elite categories are relatively powerful in such con-
texts. Intellectuals, through their (unbiased) scientific knowledge, are able to speak truth to
power not least in the development of policy based on objective evidence, without which
policy actions may well make situations worse. Truth was a particular casualty in the claims
made by both protagonists and antagonists in the Brexit debate.
Bressand (1979) notes that elite incompetence is often associated with a wider sense of
unease about life and change. It has been argued that the 2008—financial crisis was itself an
example of elite failure; the latter had become hubristically detached from the complexities
and contradictions of the financial ecosystem (Engelen et al., 2012). In turn, the underlying
roots of the crisis at least in part lay in the elite enclosure of increasing amounts of the com-
mons, and rising social inequality (Savage and Williams, 2008). Lupia and Johnston (2001)
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conclude that behind destructive referendum outcomes often lies elite manoeuvering and
misjudgment, while Morgan (this issue) identifies elite fragmentation. In other words, elite
failure helped sow the seeds of the Brexit crisis, which were reaped by means of elite bun-
gling. More broadly speaking, the central theoretical lesson of the Brexit debacle is that sys-
temic change is not always calculated nor best serving the interests of change agents or of
the wider national well-being; institutional regimes may be endangered through elite incom-
petence, even if only by a small handful of individuals. Change under such conditions is
likely to lead to particularly unpredictable outcomes.
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For many observers, the outcome of the British referendum was a total surprise. It is not nec-
essarily so for the researchers analysing the evolution of European integration and the trans-
formations of contemporary societies during the last two decades.
1. How to turn an implicit victory into a complete disaster
The Brexit vote is de facto destroying two decades of British efforts to get the best of both
worlds, i.e. access to the single large European Market without adopting either Schengen or
the Euro. The last month of negotiations by David Cameron had extended this list of exemp-
tions, for instance allowing transitory barriers to intra EU mobility and more controls by
national parliaments over the European decisions. More fundamentally, the British govern-
ment had become a central player in the EU by stopping any progress towards political inte-
gration. The UK frequently allied with Germany in the defence of competition against the
pressures by Southern European Countries governments to build more solidarity in Europe.
In retrospect, the Brexit referendum will likely appear as an incredible strategic mistake of
UK, at odds with a century of clever European diplomacy.
Brexit reflects the growing divergence in perception between political, financial and eco-
nomic elites and citizens at the grass root level. The globalization of manufacturing has
meant the shrinking of the population of blue collar workers population, whereas the UK
increasingly specialized in financial services. Consequently, the geographical polarization of
income and wealth has increased and the political map of UK has significantly changed dur-
ing the last two decades. Young people and the highly educated fraction of the population
who live in large cities, especially in London, have voted in favour of Remain. In contrast,
older people with low education, welfare dependents, and modest employees living in rural
areas and Northern England have favoured Brexit (Lord Ashcroft Polls, 2016).
This is the long-term consequence of the internationalization of the British economy and
not so much of its Europeanization. In Europe, successive British governments have been very
clever in negotiating many opt-out clauses: the social charter, the Euro, reduced participation
to the European budget or rejection of Schengen Treaty about internal mobility. Nevertheless,
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the popular press has been attributing many if not all, the domestic problems to Brussels regu-
lations and directives. This alliance between the media and nationalistic politicians such as
UKIP built a discourse that blames the EU for transformations that have been caused by the
internationalization of the British economy and its excessive reliance upon its financial sector.
This erroneous diagnosis was again confirmed by public opinion when an unprecedented flow
of refugees have entered the EU: the danger was coming from abroad and especially from the
European Commission that tried to organize a coordinated sharing of refugees among
Member States, according to rather technocratic criteria. This danger, both real and imagi-
nary, probably played a major role in explaining the Brexit vote. Last but not least, the murder
of a pro-Remain Member of Parliament makes clear the deep social division in British society.
2. A long-awaited crisis
In hindsight, such a transformation was not so difficult to predict. First of all, this polarization
of public opinion between pro- and anti-Europe movements is not specific to UK. It is present
in Central and Eastern Europe (Hungary, Poland, Czech Republic . . .), but also in the core of
the founding nations of the EU (France, Netherlands . . .). During the process leading to the
Euro, surveys had shown a clear opposition between the likely winners (large firms, professio-
nals, young people with academic degrees) and the probable losers (small firms, low skilled
workers, welfare dependent, retirees) (Boyer, 2000). In 2005, the Dutch and the French also
rejected by referendum the project instituting the Euro, but nonetheless a slightly modified
European Treaty was finally adopted by the Parliament. The Brexit vote is a simple update of
this polarization of European societies: for the Remain group, multiculturalism and accepta-
tion of immigration were assumed to be good for society, but detrimental for Brexiters (Lord
Ashcroft Polls, 2016). During the 2000s, the high degree of international liquidity and easy
access to the credit have been hiding the deflationary bias of the Lisbon Treaty and they had
smoothed over these divisions to some extent. However, the Lehman Brothers collapse and its
evolution into a Euro crisis, has meant that this European policy mix has manifested itself
through widening inequalities and sharpened the division between losers and winners. Here
comes the British paradox: the country is deeply integrated into the world economy, but the
slimming down of welfare and industrial employment has not allowed a sharing of the benefits
of globalization (The Economist, 2016). This pattern is also observed in continental Europe to
various extents. The impact of globalization is even more violent in other continents: the
restructuring of capital has implied the exclusion of various social groups (Sassen, 2014). In
Europe, this process has been reflected in the vote for nationalist/xenophobe parties.
Consequently, the EU has been perceived as promoting a free market economy without
the building a European safety net that could guaranty fair adjustments to the up and down
of the world economy. This policy orientation dates back from the very beginning of the
European integration. The project was indeed rather technocratic: lucid and informed
experts should promote new rules of the economic game to prevent the repetition of war in
Europe. Economic integration would imply spillovers to the rest of society concerning tech-
nical norms, social welfare and finally economic policy coordination. This was the hope
clearly expressed by Jean Monnet (1988) and it has inspired many of the advances in
European integration. Nevertheless, while removing trade barriers linked to tariffs was rela-
tively easy, the strengthening of competition has made the extension of welfare at the domes-
tic level or a coherent European welfare more and more difficult. Thus, the weaker countries
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have perceived the EU as an obstacle to the defence of their well-being and new parties have
been exploiting these social demands, not fulfilled by the implicit alliance between Christian
and Social democrats in the management of European institutions.
Beyond extreme social polarization in England, Brexit also points out the fragility of the UK
(e.g. the issue of Scotland independence) and may also have dramatic consequences for continen-
tal Europe. In the past, crises have been used as drivers for a deepening of economic integration
and they strengthened the idea of ‘an ever closer European integration’, the motto of the EU.
This is no longer the case with the launching of the Euro: some countries have joined (Greece
for instance), and others have declined (Denmark, UK). Similarly, the members of Schengen
agreement represent another grouping. This ‘Europe a la carte’ (flexible Europe) seemed to have
won out. However, Brexit means that one country may decide to quit this club and some other
governments might use this precedent to negotiate as many opting out clauses as nationalist
movements demand and also may decide to leave the European Single Market completely.
3. A destructive and not transformative crisis
In the light of the history and the theory of Europeanization, this structural crisis of the EU
will be very difficult to overcome, since so many contradictions and unbalances have been
piling up without adequate institutional and political reforms. Here is a step by step view:
 Since launching the Euro, the European Treaties have implied a dysfunctional economic
policy between Member States and the ECB, and between monetary and budgetary poli-
cies (Boyer, 2000). While the redeployment of financial portfolios across Europe has tem-
porary removed this incoherence (Boyer, 2013), 2016 has been the year of reckoning.
 The primacy of capital over labour, the hierarchical domination of competition over sol-
idarity and technocratic ‘expertise’ over democratic deliberation have become evident
with the Greek crisis. Clearly, past governments extended public deficits and hid them by
special financial instruments, so that Greece clearly shares responsibility here. However,
this was not a reason for denying the expression of citizens’ will, replacing the govern-
ment by the troika (European Central Bank, European Commission and IMF), and leav-
ing the Greek government without scope for autonomous decision making (Boyer,
2015a). As European and international organizations defended the rights of creditors, a
technocratic approach is replacing democracy (Streeck, 2014) in contradiction with the
objectives and motto of the EU, i.e. the promotion of democracy.
 With the inflow of political refugees from middle-east and Africa, the legitimacy of
European institutions is challenged by the public opinion of Central and Eastern
European countries. In 2015, Brussels tried to impose quota for the integration of the ref-
ugees, but it was a failure: only few wanted to migrate to France since the vast majority
preferred Germany, whereas Hungary, Poland and Czech Republic bluntly refused to wel-
come more migrants in spite of their limited number. This revealed a third divide in
Europe between Eastern and Western Europe, on top of the conflict between Northern
Europe creditors and Southern debtors, and the traditional opposition between finance-
led and export-led capitalisms, i.e. continental Europe versus UK (Boyer, 2015b).
European policymakers must now to address these three challenges, which they were
unable to overcome when they first emerged. The crisis is far more complex than all the
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previous ones and the probability of a breaking-down of 60 years of patient European inte-
gration exists (Schmitter, 2012). This scenario becomes more likely given the lack of deter-
mination of national governments preoccupied by the defence of their own interests to the
detriment of the common European public goods.
In a sense, Brexit is a follow-up of Grexit, when citizens’ referendum rejected a drastic
structural adjustment plan that strengthened a previously unsuccessful austerity plan, source
of a deep depression and rising poverty. It was nevertheless imposed by the power of creditors
from other Member States. An open conflict thus emerged between democratic principles, at
the heart of the EU, and the defence of the Euro and ‘sound’ macroeconomic policies. The
Brexiters’ vote asserted the primacy of citizens on the strategic choices of a country.
4. A dark radical uncertainty
If one accepts the previous diagnosis, no determinist prediction is possible: everything is up
to the strategic interactions between British and European key actors. The interdependencies
and issues at stake are so numerous that they challenge the conventional methods of stand-
ard economic theory (formal modelling, rational expectations, market equilibrium and
search for an optimum Brexit programme).
This uncertainty makes it problematic to set economic strategy in line with Brexit. The
past political alliance in the UK was closely associating financialized capitalism with the con-
sequences of deindustrialization, regional imbalances and growing inequalities. A reply to
the Brexiters’ demands could be two-fold.
 Either the withdrawal from the EU would be associated with a new direction for interna-
tionalization, but the related benefits would be used to control capital-based incomes (a
regulation of CEOs’ remunerations) and develop public services and welfare in the direc-
tion of the least privileged via more progressivity in personal income taxation. The first
statements by the new Prime Minister points to that direction.
 Or an isolationist ideology prevails and tries to reconstruct a productive system that
would fulfill the needs of the majority of the population and develop low-medium skill
jobs. Is such domestic consumption led growth regime possible given the large trade bal-
ance deficit and the lost expertise in the manufacturing sector?
In both scenarios, the impact of China should be taken into account: will the new jobs
created compensate the inflow of low price imports from China? The jury is still out and
many other scenarios are possible. Could England become a tax heaven at the margins of
the EU? Would the secession of Scotland imply a disintegration of UK?
The challenge addressed to British government is severe: is Brexit a rejection of European
integration or/and is it the consequence of an intense internationalization, especially in finance
and business services, not associated with a wider redistribution of these benefits to the left
behind population? Can UK build an alternative to the EU by negotiating a multiplicity of free
trade agreements or will a costly isolationism imply a new secular decline of UK?
The main concern for the other 27 members of EU is different: is the EU a mere economic
project promoting economic efficiency via more competition or does it aim at the creation of a
supranational entity organizing social solidarity within and among Member States? Clearly
the neo-functionalist paradigm, dear to the founding fathers, has failed: larger economic
Brexit: understanding the socio-economic origins and consequences 839
interdependence has not mechanically fostered more cooperation and has not led to the emer-
gence of an explicit federal State. The Euro has shown the fallacy of a common currency with-
out the backing of an European State. Quite on the contrary, harsh bargaining at the
intergovernmental level has replaced the construction of new and crucial European commons.
The interaction of the economic, social and political processes operating in UK and
Continental Europe respectively makes outcomes unpredictable. Many surprises ahead! On
one side, an ironic revenge of Remainers may arise depending on whether all social groups
loose if a hard Brexit prevails. On the other side, a new Euro crisis could create a drastic
dilemma: collapse or new course of European integration?
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The Brexit campaign played on rising discontent with the ‘migration question’, which lumps
together intra-EU mobility with immigration from outside Europe. Formally, it only
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concerned the free movement of workers in the EU, even though the ‘internationalisation’ of
the British economy goes much further than its ‘Europeanisation’ (Boyer, this volume).
However, national resentment has a pedigree here as well.
After the French ‘No’ to the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe in May 2005,
the British vote in June 2016 was the second popular referendum in an EU Member State, in
which the ‘Polish plumber’ played a major role (Arnold, 2005; Spigelman, 2013). In the course
of the EU’s Eastern enlargement, this figure has become an archetype for cheap labour migra-
tion from the new Member States. The change of time, place and context matters. In the
French campaign, massive labour migration from the East was only a spectre that did not
materialize in the end. Meanwhile, policy studies in the UK sought to demonstrate that the
inflow of migrant workers from other Member States came at a cost to the domestic welfare
system (Booth et al., 2014; Keen and Turner, 2016; Sumption and Altorjai, 2016). Leaving the
question of economically non-active EU citizens aside, analysis focused on the case of low-
paid workers from other Member States, who have a significant share in the domestic labour
market (Warhurst, this volume). As Union citizens, these workers are entitled to in-work social
benefits (in the form of refundable tax credits) in the same way as British nationals.
Obviously, the aim of these policy studies was not to assess the overall macroeconomic
effects of labour migration on the UK, but to refute the claim by scholars that migrant work-
ers tend to pay more into a national welfare system than they take out. Not surprisingly, the
arguments and findings highlighted in the reports gained broad coverage in the Brexit cam-
paign (e.g. Prynne, 2014; Doyle, 2014). If PM Cameron’s aim was to mobilize domestic vot-
ers to extract concessions from the EU regarding the status of mobile Union citizens in the
UK, the electorate’s response was overshooting: getting rid of them. A recent initiative to
‘blacklist’ foreign workers demonstrates that PM May’s government is generally prepared to
heed this wish (Ruddick and Mason, 2016; Syal, 2016).
Before the Brexit referendum, the European Council responded to the UK’s renegotiation
agenda by making concessions that cut into the core of the free movement of persons, such
as a ‘safeguard mechanism’ restricting newcomers’ access to non-contributory in-work bene-
fits for up to 4 years (European Council Conclusions, 19 February 2016, EUCO 1/16; Peers,
2016). After the British ‘Leave’ vote, the legislative template for truncating the social rights
of migrant workers is not off the table. Instead, the stakes have only risen for other Member
States, whose constituencies are aroused with similar anti-migration sentiments. One can
assume that some Heads of States and Governments not only acquiesced but eventually sym-
pathized with the UK’s requests. A closing of ranks could already be observed several years
ago in matters of ‘benefits tourism’ when Germany, Austria and the Netherlands joined the
UK to lobby for a stricter interpretation of secondary EU law specifying the conditions of
free movement (Letter by the Ministers of the Interior Mikl-Leitner, Friedrich, Teeven and
May to the President of the European Council for Justice and Home Affairs Shatter, April
2013). It is thus likely that the reform proposals attached to the Brexit threat will be revived
in future negotiations.
At the same time, the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) seems to have prepared the
ground for a reassessment of the social rights of workers along the lines of economically
non-active Union citizens, who have to fulfil certain requirements before they qualify for
non-contributory social benefits (O’Leary, 2008; Currie, 2009; Dougan, 2013). Even though
legal reasoning may, in principle, ward off politics, the migration debate has left its mark
here as well. The unusually terse prose of recent case law suggests that CJEU judges, who
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represent different national contexts and serve for limited renewable terms, do carefully
weigh the ‘potential implications of judicial choices at a time when eurosceptical political
parties are on rise across the continent, not only in the UK’ (Thym, 2015, p. 253). Hence, a
paradigm shift seems pending, which only gained urgency in the wake of Brexit. What all
this demonstrates is the contested nature of the transformation of solidarity that European
citizenship law implies (Barnard, 2005; de Witte, 2015). In practice, the price of European
solidarity seems to be that national social rights are being curbed as well.
From a socio-economic perspective, Brexit can be understood as a point of culmination
in the ‘recommodification’ of Union citizenship, which previously underwent a process of
‘decommodification’. Classically speaking, commodification means the subjection of labour
and wage-setting to market forces, whereas decommodification means the reduction of the
market dependence of workers—and also non-workers—by way of social rights. In the fol-
lowing, this terminology is adapted to the ‘Europeanisation’ of social rights underpinning
the free movement of persons (cf. Caporaso and Tarrow, 2009; Ho¨pner and Sch€afer, 2010).
In the first decades of the integration process, following the ECSC Treaty (1951) and the
EEC Treaty (1957), the focus was on the free movement of workers, who were to be granted
equal treatment with the nationals of the respective host Member States. While this meant that
migrant workers would generally benefit from ‘the same social and tax advantages as national
workers’ (Regulation No 1612/68, Art 7(2)), a core matter was the coordination of national
social security schemes regarding common social risks affecting the earning capacity of work-
ers, such as old age, sickness, unemployment and invalidity (Regulation No 1408/71, Art
4(1)). Hence, one of the aims of the Europeanization of social rights was to close possible
‘insurance gaps’ resulting from labour mobility. Being tied to worker status, as defined by EU
law, and, in the case of contributory benefits, to employment history, the first generation of
European social rights could be considered ‘commodified’ (Hartmann, 2015, p. 131). This
changed in the second phase, leading up to and following the Maastricht Treaty (1992), which
brought the social rights of economically non-active EU citizens to the fore. Instead of contrib-
utory in-work benefits, the emphasis now turned to non-contributory out-of-work benefits.
While the privileged status of workers was still left untouched, European social rights became
more ‘decommodified’ or ‘redistributive in nature’ (Hartmann, 2015 , p. 131).
The third phase reflects, or at least resonates with, a change of policies on the national
level. In many Member States, non-contributory benefits have become linked with activation
policies furthering the ‘recommodification’ of social rights (cf. Streeck, 2000; Hager, 2009).
Recent developments on the European level seem to point to the same direction, laying
emphasis on the ‘limitations and conditions’ of the right to free movement for economically
non-active EU citizens (Art 21(1) TFEU; cf. Shuibhne, 2015). This includes reassessment of
the requirements for the lawfulness of their residence, namely whether they ‘have sufficient
resources for themselves and their family members not to become a burden on the social
assistance system of the host Member State’ (Directive 2004/38/EC, Art 7(1); Case C-308/14
Com v UK, EU:C:2016:436) and when does that burden become ‘unreasonable’ (Directive
2004/38/EC, Recitals 10 and 16 of the Preamble, Art 14(1); Case C-140/12 Brey,
EU:C:2013:565). In the first 3 months of residence, Member States do not have to provide
any social assistance (Directive 2004/38/EC, Art 24(2)). Hence, whereas access to in-work
benefits is immediate, access to out-of-work benefits is usually delayed.
However, the legal refinements concern not only the group of economically non-actives.
Recent, yet already established case law of the CJEU also shows signs of a reorientation
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regarding the social rights of workers. In assessing the ‘link of integration’, which substanti-
ates eligibility for social benefits in a host Member State, the line between workers (as well
as jobseekers) and economically non-actives seems increasingly blurred, allowing the judge-
ment of both groups by the same conditions (Cases C-212/05 Hartmann EU:C:2007:437, C-
213/05 Geven, EU:C:2007:438; and C-287/05 Hendrix, EU:C:2007:494; C-138/02 Collins,
EU:C:2004:172; C-22/08 and C-23/08 Vatsouras, EU:C:2009:344; C-359/13, Martens,
EU:C:2015:118; C-220/12 Thiele Meneses EU:C:2013:683; C-20/12 Giersch,
EU:C:2013:411; C-542/09 Com v NL, EU:C:2012:346; C-158/07 Fo¨rster, EU:C:2008:630).
Compared to the beginnings of European citizenship law, therefore, attention has shifted
from contributory in-work benefits, which are status-based, to non-contributory in-work
benefits, which are usually means-tested.
Against this backdrop, Brexit only made obvious that the new emphasis on the condi-
tions of free movement has also reached the core group of workers. In the negotiations, the
EU leaders demonstrated their willingness to rewrite secondary law so that the UK could
exclude new arrivals from in-work benefits for a period of up to 4 years. It is quite likely
that other Member States will aim for a similar ‘safeguard measure’. While such initiatives
have to be agreed at the European level, national legislatures may already exploit the leeway
granted by the CJEU to limit EU citizens’ access to domestic welfare benefits. Along these
lines, a recent draft law by the German government stipulates that jobseekers from other
Member States would no longer gain access to social assistance after 6 months of residence,
as the Federal Social Court had decided, but only after 5 years (CJEU Case C–67/14
Alimanovic EU:C:2015:597; Bundessozialgericht, decision of 3 December 2015, B 4 AS 44/
15 R; Connolly, 2016).
The likely implications of Brexit can be summed up as follows: whereas the ‘employabil-
ity’ of migrant workers is enough for them to enter the labour market of a host Member
State, it may no longer suffice to join the national solidarity community. To not encourage
‘welfare migration’, labour migration is ultimately discouraged as well. From an economic
point of view, one could refer to this as throwing out the baby with the bathwater. From a
more sociological point of view, it demonstrates that the Europeanization of solidarity (here
understood in its organized, legal form) is full of conflicts. What has been described as a
transformation from national to European solidarity along the ‘division of labour’ in the
internal market (Mu¨nch, 2008; Frerichs, forthcoming), eventually challenges the ‘common
sense’ of domestic voters: that the limitations applied to migrant workers would have to
apply to national workers as well. Brexit, as shorthand for ‘reserving British workfare for
the Brits’ (cf. Booth et al., 2014; Chalmers and Booth, 2014), is obviously a backlash against
the EU law principle of non-discrimination. At the same time, the turn from welfare to
workfare, which was spearheaded by the UK, only confirms the transition ‘from status to
contract’, which guides the recommodification of social rights both on the national and the
European level.
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The historic and unexpected victory of leavers in the Brexit vote was a result of an unlikely
coalition of two ideologies, profoundly opposed to one another but reaching common
ground on the single issue: namely the claim that Brussels is the root of everything wrong
with their country. On one side were the nationalists who wanted back their island’s splen-
did isolation and saw the EU as foisting on them rules, norms and people they considered
unBritish. On the other side stood globalist libertarians who bemoaned Brussels interference
with free markets. The first deeply resented globalization which was represented in their
eyes by Brussels. The second objected to the obstacles thrown by Brussels in the path of that
very globalization.
The marriage of these strange bedfellows is unlikely to survive the next step: deciding
how to go from here. The very same force that brought unity and subsequently victory in
the referendum is likely to deliver discord and defeat when the post-EU life of the UK must
be crafted. Whether Britain will actually leave the EU in the end is less than clear. Even if it
does, it may not make much of a difference as the UK may end up with the same set of con-
ditions vis-a-vis the EU as it has now.
The significance of Brexit, however, is more profound than the fate of Britain, and
reveals a deeper historical dilemma that is being played out all over Europe. The dilemma
emerges from the tension between globalization and democracy. Democracy in its current
form as it developed in the framework of the nation state, is first and foremost about voters
deciding who will get to run the nation state. The nation state, as it emerged in the 19th cen-
tury, was the natural institutional framework for politics, just as it was for culture and the
economy.
As the fall of the Berlin Wall ushered in the post-cold war era, and globalization began to
gain momentum, nation states found themselves in a particular quandary. They began to
encounter forces they could not control but which had profound effects on their citizens.
Those citizens had a particularly frustrating experience: they voted for their national leaders
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who, once elected, were often powerless in the face of global processes such as the transna-
tional movement of capital, people, ideas, arms, diseases and environmental damage. Above
the level of the nation state institutions have been sparse and ineffectual. The institutional
framework that comprises the nation state is unable to deal with these supranational proc-
esses as politicians solely accountable to their own national electorates use their state’s insti-
tutions without any consideration to electorates in other nations.
Global processes, currently unfolding in an under- or unregulated manner, need global
institutions. Global institutions need democratic legitimacy, yet the historical forms of
democracy on offer are national, not global.
The solution seems clear: supranational processes need supranational democratic institu-
tions. The EU has been an attempt to construct just that. While the EU is not a global institu-
tion it is so far the best attempt to answer this challenge. It is richly ironic that it is the
medicine that is being blamed for the disease.
There is a clear pattern emerging from the mismatch between democracy and globaliza-
tion. Countries hold elections. Political elites gain the levers of the nation state. Nation states
buffeted by global forces do not have the power to deliver on political promises and expecta-
tions. Democracy does not seem to work, electorates become both disillusioned and radical-
ized and soon see regaining national sovereignty as the only remedy.
Populist nationalism is on the rise, seriously threatening the European project aiming at
integrating nation states. While in most European countries populist nationalism is still an
insurgent, anti-establishment project putting governments under increasing pressure to
adopt some of its agenda, in Hungary and Poland populist nationalists were already voted
into power.
Hungary’s twice elected government that has been an aggressive critic of European inte-
gration held its own plebiscite in October asking people whether to accept mandatory quo-
tas to resettle migrants in Hungary. As critics pointed out, there is no EU plan to force
Hungary to resettle migrants. The EU plan, now largely defunct, would have called for
Hungary to grant asylum for about 1300 refugees, a small number in a country of 10 mil-
lion. By conflating migrants and refugees and asylum with resettlement, the Orban govern-
ment was seeking popular support for its anti-EU stance. The referendum failed to mobilize
enough people to be counted as valid, but rather than accepting defeat, the government
decided to raise the stakes and change its constitution to include protections for Hungary’s
‘constitutional identity’, which includes the right to refuse foreign settlers but also opens a
larger legal claim to resist other steps towards European integration.
Hungary, as one of the largest net recipients of EU funds, is not contemplating Huxit just
now, but like Brexit proponents, it wants to have its cake and eat it too. Both the Hungarian
government and British leavers want all the benefits of globalization while keeping their full
national sovereignty. The only difference is that Hungary envisions achieving this within the
EU and Britain as a non-member with all the privileges of membership. With Brexit, Hungary
lost an important political ally in its resistance to European integration and now it is hoping to
gain new ones through upcoming elections in other powerful countries. Prime Minister Viktor
Orban with his aggressive stance hopes to set off an avalanche of similar referenda and legal
action in other countries, orchestrating a popular revolt against European integration.
Democracy may be the undoing of Europe but not because, as we hear it so often in the
wake of the Brexit decision, people are irrational, uneducated or gullible. No polity will sur-
vive that requires a fully rational, highly knowledgeable and farsighted majority. Democracy is
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about organizing human imperfection for the best results. Democracy may end the most sensi-
ble attempt so far to reign in globalization not because people are imperfect but because our
notions of democracy are too much tied to this 19th century invention: the nation state.
If we, like the founders of the EU, want to avoid a balkanized Europe of hostile nation
states, we have to continue to think about ways of making global institutions more account-
able but we also must rethink the nation state to understand what we can learn from its resil-
ience, what powers it should give up to super-national institutions and what powers it
should devolve to regional and local ones.
There are two pillars on which the current appeal of nation states rest: one is security,
the other is culture. For most people, nation states are the main source of safety. It is the
nation state that pools risks of sickness, old age, crime and loss of jobs. Healthcare, pension,
law and order and unemployment insurance are all currently in national jurisdictions. Many
of those functions, partially or fully can and should be delivered by European institutions if
the EU is to survive.
The obvious difficulty of federalizing these programmes is not that people want to have
these protections wrapped in their national flag but that the large inequalities across coun-
tries would at least in the short run, either call for enormous additional funds necessary to
raise the level in poorer states to the level of the richest ones, or for some levelling, to bring
the richest states down a few notches to a common middle ground. This therefore cannot be
accomplished overnight, yet some of these security systems are easier to federalize than
others. For instance, a generous and uniform unemployment insurance system, still tied to
local wages but paid by uniform rules and from a central EU fund, would not just improve
the lives of millions in countries like Greece and Hungary, but it would stabilize the
European economy by quickly injecting funds in depressed economic regions. Offering peo-
ple a common European pension system would not just buffer countries most adversely hit
by aging demographics, but would increase labour mobility. A common European health-
care system would benefit the EU as a whole in similar ways. Pension and healthcare would
face the same challenges of levelling, but it could begin as a two tiered system, where
employers and workers could opt into an EU pension and health insurance system that exist
alongside the national ones. These could first be available for internal migrants—people
who move from one EU country to another for work—and those employed by multinational
companies. Two-tier voluntary insurance schemes are always vulnerable to skimming; richer
people moving to the upper tier sharing resources only among themselves and leaving the
poor with less available in the second tier. This calls for some redistribution between the EU
and the national systems with the long-term aim of making the EU option the dominant one.
Fighting crime should be both federalized and localized. Terrorists must be battled by an
all-European police and the same goes for corporate malfeasance. But traffic fines and bur-
glaries should be handled locally.
There is one successful example of the nation state ceding substantial control of a central
security function. It took the devastation of World War II, the subsequent Cold War and
American dominance to create NATO, still, no one would have anticipated 70 years ago that
powerful nations like France and Germany would have their armies under joint command.
Nation states are also strong cultural organisms. In fact, their ability to build a national
culture, and a common cultural identity is key to their success and resilience. Without a
shared European identity, European integration is bound to fail. European identity would
not replace national identities. Just as people can identify with their locality and their
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country at the same time, identifying as European would add another layer to how people
think of themselves.
One of the key instruments of nurturing national identities has been each nation’s own
education system. The French, the Spanish, the Germans and the Poles all learn in school
what it means to be members of their imagined community. They study their national lan-
guage, history, and learn about their great poets, artists and scientists. For the EU to build
its own cultural identity, it will have to construct European educational institutions. This
has started already in tertiary education, but needs to extend to the level of elementary and
middle schools as well. Every region should have a few European public schools with a
nationally inflected but fundamentally European curriculum, where parents can opt to send
their children from an early age. The EU also should expand its own media. Newspapers,
journals, radio and TV programmes or stations produced in various languages for national
audiences but with EU financing and oversight should have a much stronger presence. The
EU is already engaging in supporting various cultural and scientific projects. This, however,
reaches only a small educated elite. The EU needs to broaden its cultural reach.
At the same time, anyone who wants to save the EU must think creatively about how to
make democracy fit a federal Europe. The first step is to decouple EU political institutions
from national party politics. As opposed to national parties and governments being repre-
sented in EU political bodies, people should be voting directly for European parties and rep-
resentatives. In elections EU citizens should cast a ballot for both a European party and an
individual representing their region, running on a European agenda, as opposed to as dele-
gates of their national parties receiving votes on the basis of popularity of their party’s
domestic policies. Furthermore, there must also be space for participatory democracy at the
European level. Recent technology makes this a realistic possibility.
With Brexit, the EU has arrived at a critical juncture. If it tries to appease the populist
nationalists without addressing the fundamental contradiction of globalization and democ-
racy it risks a gradual disintegration of the EU. The alternative is to develop new institutions
at the European level that take over gradually the provision of security, foster European cul-
ture and identity and build a new autonomous European polity. This may require a step
back, creating first an inner circle of core countries, more similar to each other in terms of
wealth, values and political intentions.
Brexit: UK as an exception or the banal
avant garde of the disintegration of the EU?
Patrick Le Gale`s
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Four months after the drama of the Brexit vote, a deep fog is, once again, isolating the conti-
nent from the UK. Britain is in Europe, but is leaving the EU. If ‘Brexit means Brexit’ the
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decisive but vague mantra of new prime Minister Teresa May, nobody seems to have a clue
about what happens next. Brexit leaders had no plans. A gambling, shortsighted and elitist
Prime Minister has lightly risked the existence of the UK twice: he was lucky on the Scottish
referendum, but not on Europe. Brexit is deeply rooted in the contradictions of contempo-
rary western political economies within a globalized economy (Baker et al., 2002; Bermeo
and Bartels, 2014; Beramendi et al., 2015), inequalities and finance (Crouch, 2016) and their
dangerous political expression.
1. The Brexit vote brings evidence of profound inequalities and
cleavages
The two camps were neck to neck in opinion polls for 2 years. Despite all the hype about
Brexit, the electorate remains seeming steady with the result since more than 90% express-
ing no regret about the vote and would do the same (http://whatukthinks.org/eu/brexit-post-
referendum-hopes-and-expectations). The stormy political events post referendum did not
change the opinion despite a broad range of political events: Cameron’s resignation, the hos-
tile leadership campaign in the Labour Party, the resignation of Nigel Farage from UKIP (his
successor only lasted 18 days), the damaging and at time ridiculous campaign for the leader-
ship of the Conservative party from the two Brexit leaders Boris Johnson and Michael Gove,
the lack of plan B from the British civil service, the mobilization of the youth, and the 4 mil-
lion signature against Brexit, or the decline of the British Pound (minus 14% since the refer-
endum against the dollar).
The profound divisions underlined by the Brexit debate are unlikely to disappear (Hay,
2016). The Brexit vote was first about sovereignty and immigration together with the hostil-
ity and failure of the EU. The vote reflected clear dividing line in terms of education, income,
age. Goodin and Heath (2016) after referendum report’s title says it all ‘Brexit vote
explained: poverty, low skills and lack of opportunities . . . educational inequality that was
the strongest driver. Other things being equal, support for leave was 30 percentage points
higher among those with GCSE qualifications or below than it was for people with a
degree’.5 The focus on immigration and sovereignty was ferociously echoed in the media. It
opened the floor for racist comments and behaviours. During the campaign and after the
vote, the police reported a rise of violence, attacks, insults, against ethnic minorities and for-
eigners, epitomized by the assassination of the labour MP Jo Cox, a prominent advocate of
the rights of those minorities. On the 27th of August, a Polish worker was killed in Harlow
during the attack of a group of Polish men. Those racist attacks have remained at high ebb
ever since: the Home Office has recorded an increase of 41% in the number of ‘racially or
religiously aggravated crimes’in England and Wales after the referendum (2016).
As in other European countries, growing inequalities and poverty have been associated
with the crisis of financial capitalism. According to Eurostat, about 123 million people are
now at risk of living in poverty in Europe. Since 2009, the number of people living in what
Eurostat frames as ‘severe material deprivation’ (i.e. percentage of people lacking at least 4
of a list of 9 basic items or activities such as a warm home) has risen from 7.5 to 50 million
5 For a precise analysis see the results published by the British Election Studies team, http://www.brit
ishelectionstudy.com/bes-resources/brexit-britain-british-election-study-insights-from-the-post-eu-
referendum-wave-of-the-bes-internet-panel/#.WAiMyFuDelg
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people. Together with southern Europe and Ireland, the UK had the strongest growth of
poor people at around 8% of the population in 2014, which is far less than Greece or
Bulgaria but two points higher than Germany or France. The UK has one of the highest lev-
els of income inequality with the EU: according to the OECD, the Gini coefficient 0.358 in
2013, the highest of the EU (except Estonia) compared to less than 0.3 for Germany, France,
or Denmark (0.256). Over the past decade, the UK, wage inequality has remarkably grown
more than anywhere else (Fernandez-Macıas and Vacas Soriano, 2015). And despite the rel-
atively low level of unemployment, real wages have fallen more than anywhere except
Greece. According to the OECD employment Outlook, real wages (i.e. income from work
adjusted for inflation) increased across 29 OECD countries by 6.8% from 2007 to 2015
(14% in Germany, 11% in France). In contrast, they fell by 10.4% in the UK. Meanwhile,
prior to the crisis the top 1% gained 15.4% of national wealth compared to only 9% in
France or 13% in Germany (France strate´gie 2016 based upon the World Wealth and
income data base). In other words, a large part of the population has good reason to feel
alienated from economic and political elites. As is now well known, the massive gains of the
top 1% are closely associated with the financial sector and the City of London. A referen-
dum is always a great opportunity to express opposition to the existing political and social
order.
A second point to emphasize is the legacy of Mrs Thatcher. Britain transformed itself by
using the strong state to impose market mechanisms, competition and promote what
Crouch (2011) called a financial private Keynesianism. This policy approach has led to pro-
found territorial and income inequalities. As New Labour left office in 2009, the UK
General government spending was 49.6% of GDP (OECD figures), which is close to the
European average. The coalition government and then conservative led by David Cameron
has chosen the austerity road and tax cuts to increase the debt and cut public expenditure
down to 43.6% of GDP in 2014 and are aiming at 35%. With the exception of Ireland, no
other European country has cut expenditure so quickly and with a strong impact on disad-
vantaged groups. Massive cuts have been implemented in various social services and local
services (about half the budget of Liverpool for instance).
2. The EU, the elites and immigration: Britain as a ‘banal’ EU country
Brexit results have amplified common trends in Europe and may reveal the UK to be an
avant garde of what may happen next in Europe.
The campaign was UK centred. The rise of anti-European, anti-metropolitan liberal elites
and anti-immigration feelings that have become common in other European countries
received little attention before the vote. But the rise of far right racist anti-immigrant parties
is a major trend of European politics. In France, Germany, Poland, Italy, Spain, the
Netherlands, Slovakia, Hungary or Nordic countries, classic pro-European centre right and
centre left parties are being challenged by extreme right parties (National Front in France,
True Fins (now the Finns Party), Alternative Fu¨r Deutschland, Austria FDP, The party for
Freedom in the Netherlands) populist parties (Five star in Italy, Orban populist right wing
FIDESZ in Hungary). Election after election, those parties are gaining ground at the local,
regional, EU and national level by attacking immigration, the EU and singing the praise of
sovereign nations. A referendum on the EU is the perfect occasion to express those views.
Britain’s UKIP and radicalized sections of the Conservative party are in tune with the rest of
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Europe. If a similar referendum had taken place the same day in the 27 countries of the EU,
how many would have given a clear mandate to remain in the EU? Most countries are div-
ided on the European issue in relation to migration.
Comparative social scientists have written at length about this increasing divide between
those benefitting from Europe, with higher level of education, younger, urban, with liberal
values, against those loosing from globalization trends, from the 2008 crisis, from the lack
of protection offered by the EU, resenting immigration and the refugee crisis (older, more
rural, lower level of education). N. Fligstein’s Euroclash, or H. P. Kriesi’s projects on democ-
racy and globalization (2008) or the rise of European populism (2015) have analysed those
ongoing dynamics. The rise of populism in Europe is a long-term process. Peter Mair (2006)
has emphasized the erosion of the representative function of European party systems.
Europe has also proved a major driver of liberalization and competition without protections
for entire regions and social groups, and a long-term democratic deficit (Ho¨pner, 2015). The
economic crisis has accelerated the rise of populism, an element of the crisis of democratic
capitalism (Streeck, 2011).
From that point of view, the UK is one European country among others with similar divi-
sions, inequality and mobilization against the elites, the immigrants, and Europe. As in
many other European countries, the level of education proved the main predictor of the
vote: more educated citizens are inclined to have liberal values, to be at ease with immigra-
tion and to support the EU. That also echoes the Tea Party in the USA or the extreme right
in Australia.
The UK debate was particularly dominated by the immigration question, which was ulti-
mately even more central the refugee crisis. Since the early 2000, net migration to the UK
has been around 200 000 and 350 000 per year (around 300 000 last year). The arrival of
migrants from Eastern Europe (between 800 000 and 900 000 Polish citizens live in the UK)
has made London in particular a formidable multicultural metropolis, but antagonized
many British. The EU has taken the blame for what has been framed as ‘a broken immigra-
tion system’.
Finally, the Brexit vote has powerfully confirmed the territorial dimension of the trans-
formation of European societies. In most centralized European countries, a gap is growing
between those living in the more urbanized, larger metropolis (sometimes regional urban
systems in Lombardia or the Netherlands), often the capital and the rest of the country.
From Prague to Lisbon or Stockholm, London and Paris, the gap reflects the concentration
of the skilled population, the level of inequality, the productivity (as the economy and
wealth generation is becoming more urban), the connections to the rest of the world and
transnational mobility, the diversity of the population, housing prices, the concentration of
elite schools, university, research centres (Crouch and Le Gale´s, 2012). In the UK, London
epitomized those transformations in terms of cultural diversity, labour market, house prices,
productivity. London has become a wealth generating centre attracting billionaires from all
over the world and massive investment. It is also home to the City is located and the insane
bonuses that have been generously distributed to traders and managers. Meanwhile, other
regions are in economic and social decline, following the Mezzogiorno road in Italy, large
areas Eastern Germany, the north west of France, the northern part of northern countries,
the periphery of the Czech Republic or North East England. As territorial inequalities
increase, national policy remains oriented towards the new ‘national champions’ crucial for
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economic development, e.g. main metropolis. The UK exemplifies this trend. Consequently,
people feel abandoned by the state, the EU and the urban elites.
Ironically, only some nations without a state like Scotland have also become staunch EU
supporters (but also Catalonia in Spain). Under the leadership of the Scottish Nationalist
Party, Scotland is reaffirming its difference from Britain. Scotland voted to remain (62%),
and within Scotland, in the capital Edinburgh, 74.4% voted in favour of Remain. In
England, the Remain vote won in London by a strong majority of over 60% (except in the
poorest peripheries of Greater London East and West), Remain prevailed in Liverpool,
Manchester, Newcastle, Leeds, Bristol, Cardiff, and smaller more affluent ones like Exeter,
Norwich or Leicester, but not the industrial core of the Midlands like Birmingham. In the
home counties, in the north and in the Midlands, the core of England and Wales rejected
Europe. This cleavage appears to be more and more territorialized. Middle classes are
increasingly urban liberal middle classes. Tellingly, the post Brexit debate has been framed
in terms of a revolt against metropolitan elites in London. Continuous gentrification of
urban areas has been reflected in sky rocketing property prices, oblivious to wider economic
crisis. Property ownership and housing prices have contributed to the creation of these mas-
sive inequalities. Class divisions now combine work, property and space.
The day after Brexit, most UK political leaders were speechless, including leading conser-
vative Brexiters. However, both the first ministers of Scotland and Northern Ireland and the
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Mayor of London are now exerting serious pressure on the UK government to stay in the
EU. To avoid a constitutional crisis, they envisage special workers permits for EU workers
and access the Single market for London, Scotland and Northern Ireland. Scotland is already
preparing a second independent referendum if a hard Brexit included Scotland. The Irish
question is not over either and the remaking of a new frontier between Northern Ireland and
Ireland would carry many economic and political risks. Gibraltar is also agitated, but that is
less of an issue . . . except for the Spanish.
3. Conclusion
In many ways, Britain is an obvious exception in Europe: an island that was not invaded,
where Henri the VIIIth rejected Catholicism, where no revolution took place since Cromwell
(1640–1660), where peasants were eradicated at an early stage, where industrialization was
massive during the 19th century, and the empire dominated the world in the 19th century.
More recently, Mrs Thatcher initiated a profound restructuring of state and society
(Gamble, 1993). The UK was a late comer and outlier in the EU. Yes Britain is different. But
as Timothy Garton Ash (2016) put it ‘being an island makes a difference, but geography is
not destiny’. Enough has been said on the peculiarity of the British approach to the EU. Let
us just emphasize the lack of understanding of anything remotely associated with the EU in
the vast majority of the population (thanks in particular to Murdoch’s popular press) despite
holidays in Europe, the openness of the labour market or retirement homes on the Costa
Brava. In contrast to the majority of Europeans (first of all the educated ones), the English
have not combined their national identity with a local/regional or European one. They do
not learn the languages either. According to Eurostat Foreign language learning statistics
(http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statisticsexplained/index.php/Foreign_language_learning_statis
tics), with the exception of Greece, the UK as the lowest share of secondary education stu-
dents learning two or more languages, below 10% and decreasing since 2009. More than on
the Continent, part of the population does not consider itself as European at all. The compa-
rative research of Duchesne et al. (2013) on attitudes towards Europe was crystal clear:
English citizen did not know anything about the EU and were basically more hostile than
their Belgian or French counterparts. From Mrs Thatcher to David Cameron, EU bashing
has been a normal sport in political debates, probably in more systematic ways than any-
where else and with massive support from the media. The economic crisis, the refugee crisis,
pressures on the Euro and immigration, combine to stress the shortcomings of the EU. Why
bother with an EU that is economically failing and sending its immigrants to the UK?
Brexit is also one kind of expression of democracy (Streeck, 2012). Many people deeply
resented the EU. Despite all the warnings, the optimism of the elites was shocking both at the
time of Cameron’s speech about the referendum and until the very last moment. At the end of
the day, it was thought that reasonable and rational British men and women would follow
their economic interest. The fear of the Brexit chaos put forward at length by the Remain cam-
paign was supposed to suffice even if for years, the same politicians had blamed Europe for
everything. They had made a caricature of the EU system. Meanwhile, good reasons existed
for some section of the population to vote for Brexit. If the EU and the elites do not protect citi-
zens from the crisis and economic difficulties, why bother? The Brexit vote most importantly
underlines income and territorial inequalities, a growing cleavage between globalization win-
ners and losers and a profound Brexistential crisis about the future of the UK.
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